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Inflation Targeting is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient  
John A. Tatom 
 
Fed Chair Ben Bernanke is a strong proponent of inflation targeting, conducting 
monetary policy to achieve an announced target.  He and others argue that this would 
increase the transparency of the Fed and make it more accountable by providing a 
specific numerical objective on which performance can be judged. It is widely believed 
that such transparency would improve the inflation performance and the predictability of 
the future course of inflation and of monetary policy actions.   
 
Japanese policy critics also call for the adoption of inflation targeting to enhance 
transparency.  In Japan deflation is perceived to have been ended, so “zero interest rate” 
and “quantitative easing” policies are expected to change to allow a tighter policy to 
constrain inflation.  Since policy must change anyway, critics argue, there is an easy 
opening to adopt a new policy regime.  Clarity of communication is no substitute for 
performance, however.  Unless a central bank that targets inflation and communicates its 
objectives well can also deliver on low and predictable inflation, transparency is 
worthless. Words are not substitutes for actions.     
 
Transparency is supposed to be valuable because it allows markets to anticipate future 
policy and so reduces surprises that disturb resource allocation, employment, output and 
prices.  Any policy risk premium in real and nominal interest rates should be lower in 
countries with higher degrees of transparency.  Proponents of inflation targeting suggest 
that such countries better understand their responsibility for price stability and better 
communicate their superior policy target.  Thus, they also should achieve lower inflation. 
Studies have failed to find evidence that inflation-targeting countries achieve lower or 
more stable inflation, however.  
 
A new study by economists Sylvester Eijffinger and Petra Geraats (European Journal of 
Political Economy, March 2006) ranks central bank transparency for nine countries.  The 
US is sixth, behind, in decreasing order, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK, Canada, and the 
Eurozone.  Japan ranks even lower at eighth, behind Australia and ahead of last-place 
Switzerland.  And that should raise red flags.  Transparency must not be very important if 
the Swiss score so low.   
 
Switzerland has a long history as a successful inflation fighter.  Switzerland had the third 
lowest inflation in the group in 2005, only 1.0 percent.  They also have the lowest excess 
of the 10-year government bond yield over recent inflation at 0.95 percent.  If monetary 
policy can achieve low inflation and the lowest long-term interest rates relative to 
inflation despite the lowest level of transparency, then the latter cannot be worth much.  
The Swiss National Bank delivers, and they do so consistently, contributing to the lowest 
real cost of capital in the world.   
 
Japan, often reviled as a failed central bank because of its 1990-2004 stagnation, has the 
lowest inflation rate in the group (-0.3%).  In other contexts and in economic theory, such 
a degree of price stability or steady and moderate deflation would be an optimal result, 
though analysts have questioned this in recent years. Japan also enjoys the third lowest 
real interest rate at about 1.77 percent, at least as measured by the excess of the 10-year 
government bond yield over the most recent year’s inflation rate at the end of 2005. 
Whatever Japan is doing, it seems to enjoy the lowest inflation rate and the lowest real 
rate of interest of the nine countries, despite their low transparency.  Apparently their 
pursuit of price stability is being communicated more credibly than the rest. 
 
At the other extreme, the country with the highest transparency, New Zealand, had near 
average inflation in 2005 (1.5%) and the highest real interest rate (4.3%). Having the 
highest transparency has not given the New Zealanders a lower cost of capital.  In fact, 
the four countries with most transparent central banking policies are among the five 
countries with the highest excess of the government bond yield over inflation. Sweden, 
the only other country with high transparency and low inflation (0.5%), had the second 
highest real interest rate at the end of 2005 (2.8 %).   
 
While the US ranks sixth in transparency, it had the second lowest real interest rate 
(1.1%) in the group, just above the rate in Switzerland.  Apparently the Federal Reserve 
has a very high degree of anti-inflation credibility with the global marketplace, despite 
the surge in inflation to 3.4 percent in 2005, the highest pace in the group for the year 
ending in December 2005.  Apparently the marketplace believes that this surge is 
temporary, so that nominal interest rates remained among the lowest in the world 
adjusted for inflation. No doubt the US could benefit from an explicit Fed target that is 
able to be monitored, but just taking up inflation targeting is not likely to be beneficial.       
 
Countries that do not target inflation and therefore have the lowest central bank 
transparency generally had lower inflation and lower real interest rates in 2005.  The 
patterns for inflation and real rates are not peculiar to 2005.  They have longer standing 
than inflation targeting or concern for transparency.  The 2005 real interest rates of the 
nine countries are systematically and negatively related to their transparency scores, 
hardly a selling point for transparency or its principal determinant, monetary targeting.  
There are, no doubt, other reasons why real interest rates vary across these countries, but 
it is difficult to think of how such reasons could give rise to such a significant negative 
relationship between transparency and real interest rates.  Japan, the Swiss and the US 
have little to learn from central banks that target inflation, at least if market outcomes are 
the indicator of success. 
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Table  
Are there gains from transparency? 
 
Central Banks 
Transparency 
score 
10-year 
bond yield 
inflation 
rate 
real interest 
rate 
1. New Zealand 14.0 5.83% 1.50% 4.33% 
2. Sweden 14.0 3.30 0.50 2.80 
3. UK 13.0 4.22 1.92 2.30 
4. Canada 10.5 3.93 2.15 1.78 
5. Eurozone 
(*Germany) 
10.5 3.4* 1.98* 1.42* 
6. US 10.0 4.47 3.38 1.09 
7. Australia 9.0 5.20 2.80 2.40 
8. Japan 8.0 1.47 -0.30 1.77 
9. Switzerland 7.5 1.96 1.01 0.95 
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